The crisis of Euro and its deepest consequences

 

The recent debt crisis in the peripheral countries of EU revealed a real problem of leadership in the EU, a leadership that it is not only about EU unification but about facing the antagonism from US,  since the crucial  future issues behind the decisions by EU is the antagonism of Euro vs. Dollar for a share to global markets as world currencies and the challenges that come from China and other BRIC countries.

The US and China of course don’t want the collapse of Euro because this will mean the collapse of the global financial and currency system, something that would cost dearly to everyone. But both they are benefited by a Euro zone that will not lead the developments but will have a second role while being affected by US or China depending the balance of power. This can explain the interest of China to buy second class European debt and European assets in Greece and elsewhere.

We also  all finally understood that probably the Euro shouldn’t be extended, at least yet, beyond a core of countries around Germany like Holland, France, Austria that have similar economies and  the Scandinavians, if they wanted too. But Euro zone was extended to soon for political reasons and for the short term economic gains, since a zone of 16 countries was created where the above core countries could export their products, especially Germany and France, while the common currency was backed up by an economic zone with a total GDP of 8,4 trillion Euros.

Many economists and analysts now talk about the possibility of a core zone that will be created around Germans not de jure (by law) but de facto, something that means that there will be a permanent difference among the core and the peripheral countries in their real value  of their “common” currencies and their  inflations without ever being declared a creation of two different currencies.

I think this means that the peripheral countries would have to work their asses off to reach the level of North Europe, decrease corruption and increase efficiency and competitiveness. I find this scenario quite fair and proper for everyone but in realistic terms it is very optimistic and even unattainable at least in the short term. In Greece for example a development like that will need many years and deep structural changes.

Also to be really fair we should never forget that there are objective obstacles for a convergence among European nations, since there is not any industrial or other base where most small peripheral countries could sustain a competitive advantage, while you cannot change  deeply rooted wrong mentalities of people fast and easily without investing a lot of time and effort . Still these changes are not impossible to happen but they need a lot of time and more importantly, common economic and political decisions under a common political framework and a common political will inside the EU.

For sure in many Southern countries there are increased levels of corruption and non-transparency that leads to inefficiencies and lack of competitiveness and the final responsibility should burden those countries with the problem and not anyone’s else, but I think this is only a small part of the problem of EU and by no means the real source of the  problems that Euro-zone faces today.

The question many times phrased as  if the South Europeans are going to pull down the North or if the North will help the Southerns to stand on their feet at its own expense. Still I think the question is framed wrongly, there is a different division of labor among Euro zone nations and in this time of crisis the countries with strong exporting industries like France and Germany with surpluses have an advantage. I still insist that the extension of Eurozone aimed  to the creation of a vast market and a vast geographically economy that will back up the common currency while in the minds of most Europhiles and bureaucrats there was and is always the hope of a complete political unification  in the future, something for sure quite difficult considering the many cultural obstacles.

But there was a mutual benefit for all while the division among North and South is not an absolute measure. For example in 2007 Germany exported  goods of a value of 624 billions Euro to EU out of its total exports of 964 billions  and France exported to EU 261 billions Euro out of 403 billions of its  total exports. Also Belgium a Northern country starts to face similar debt problems with a total government debt more than 100% of GDP and now is getting in the wary eye of speculators, while the budget deficit and debt problems of UK is also well known.

However if finally two different zones will be created the Germans and the other advanced countries will have a short and mid term gain avoiding the cost of paying the deficits of the others from their surplus.

However we shouldn’t never forget that the only way for the EU to be a real antagonist of USA and of the emerging giants of China, India and Brazil is to create a currency zone as big as possible.  And this would not happen without the inclusion of South and in the future of Eastern Europe.

This would be a long term political and economic gain that will be lost with a restricted euro zone. I think everything  is about political decisions concerning a trade off of short and midterm economic gains with long term political gains of strategic importance that will finally be translated to economic gains and if finally Germany and France  really want a European Union that will become a super power similar to US and China and would be able to compete in the global arena.

 

 

Read Full Post »

H ΚΡΙΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΥΡΩ -ΣΥΝΕΝΤΕΥΞΗ ΠΡΩΗΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟΥ ΚΑΓΚΕΛΑΡΙΟΥ ΣΜΙΤ

MIA ΣΥΝΕΝΤΕΥΞΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΗΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟΥ ΚΑΓΚΕΛΑΡΙΟΥ ΣΜΙΤ ΠΟΥ ΥΠΗΡΞΕ ΚΑΙ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ ΤΗς ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΩΤΕΡΓΑΤΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ. ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΠΤΙΚΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΟ ΤΙ ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΖΩΝΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΦΤΑΙΕΙ ΑΠΟ ΚΑΠΟΙΟΝ ΠΟΥ ΗΤΑΝ ΜΕΣΑ ΣΤΟ ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ ΚΑΙ ΒΟΗΘΗΣΕ ΝΑ ΦΤΙΑΧΤΕΙ ΚΙΟΛΑΣ.

Schmidt: Leadership wanted in Europe
Former chancellor as blunt as ever in exclusive interview
By David Marsh, MarketWatch

Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt sits down for an exclusive interview with David Marsh, a MarketWatch columnist and co-chairman of the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. A Social Democrat, Schmidt was chancellor of West Germany from 1974 to 1982. He also served as finance minister, economics minister, and defense minister.
HAMBURG, Germany (MarketWatch) — Celebrating his 92nd birthday later this month, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is as penetrating as ever in his political and economic judgments, as a long conversation with him in his Hamburg office shows.
The full interview is being published in the Monthly Bulletin of the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum on Dec. 7. David Marsh is co-chairman of OMFIF and a columnist for MarketWatch.
David Marsh: For many years Germany had twin policies on parallel lines: commitment to financial and monetary stability on the one hand, commitment to European integration on the other. With the crisis in economic and monetary union, do you think that the two policies are no longer compatible?
Reuters

EXCLUSIVE
Schmidt: Europe needs leaders

In an exclusive interview, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt says Europe may lack the political will and leadership to defend the euro and the EU.

Helmut Schmidt: Let me give you an answer first about the general political environment. I don’t know about the British government — they are rather new in office and I do not know the leading people. So I exclude the British from my general answer. But I would say that, in general, Europe lacks leaders. It lacks people in high positions in the national states or in the European institutions with sufficient overview of domestic and international questions and sufficient power of judgment. There are a few exceptions such as [Prime Minister Jean-Claude] Juncker of Luxembourg, but Luxembourg is a bit too small to play a substantial role.
More specifically, I do not think that the Germans in general or the German political class in Germany have given up on stability. The circumstances in 2008-10 forced them — like almost everyone else in the world — to violate their stability ideals, but this was not an act of free will, it was the result of economic downturn.
I would say that, in general, Europe lacks leaders. It lacks people in high positions in the national states or in the European institutions with sufficient overview of domestic and international questions and sufficient power of judgment.
Additionally, the present German government is composed of people who are learning their business on the job. They have no previous experience in world political affairs or in world economic affairs. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble is a man whom I wish well and for whom I have great personal respect. He well understands budgetary and taxation problems. But when it comes to international money markets or capital markets or the banking system or the supervision of banks or shadow banks, this is all new to him. The same goes for [Chancellor Angela] Merkel. This is not to say anything negative about Schäuble or anything negative about Merkel, but we need people in high office who understand the economic world of today. ΜΗΠΩΣ ΕΔΩ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΝΑ ΠΕΙ ΟΤΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΟΥΣΙΑ ΕΞΥΠΗΡΕΤΟΥΝ ΤΑ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΑΓΟΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΤΟ ΛΕΕΙ ΠΙΟ ΕΥΓΕΝΙΚΑ

Marsh: But some people would say the problem goes deeper than that. By going into a monetary union without political union, and without the perspective of a political union, some people would say that this was a fundamental birth defect.
Schmidt: This is what the Bundesbank have been repeating it for 30 years. In their innermost heart they are reactionaries. They are against European integration.
Marsh: Who do you mean precisely? Who are you thinking of, because people like [former Bundesbank President Hans] Tietmeyer are no longer playing an important role?
Schmidt: But his successors, more or less with one exception, are reactionaries with regard to European integration. They are not really characterized by liberal thinking. They tend to act and react too much under the aspect of national interests and haven’t understood the strategic necessity of European integration.
Ο Schmidt ΕΝΝΟΕΙ ΟΤΙ Η BUNDESBANK ΑΠΟΡΡΙΠΤΕΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ ΓΙΑ ΕΘΝΙΚΟΥΣ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ΕΝΩ Η ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ ΔΕΝ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΕΛΙΚΑ ΒΑΘΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΥΝΑΤΟΤΗΤΑ ΔΙΑΤΗΡΗΣΗΣ ΧΩΡΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ, ΠΑΡΟΛΑ ΑΥΤΑ ΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ ΔΗΛΑΔΗ ΣΧΙΖΟΦΡΕΝΙΚΗ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΗ

Marsh: There is this expression: Beim Geld hört die Freundschaft auf. [Friendship stops with money.]. One has the feeling that the Germans are now being asked as a collectivity to help the poorer states. And the Germans find this very difficult.
Schmidt: The mistake was made around the time of Maastricht, in 1991-92. At this time we were 12 member countries in Europe. They not only invited everybody to become a member of European Union but they also invented the euro and invited everybody to become a member of the euro area. And this was done without changing the rules or clarifying the rules beforehand. This was when the great mistakes were made. What we are suffering now is the consequence of that failure.

Marsh: Should the EU states have decided the euro just for a small group of countries?
Merkel would like to correct this mistake, but her chances of prevailing are rather small, particularly because she is not a very smooth operator.
Schmidt: This is my view — and also they should have defined more strongly the rules on the economic behavior of the participants. The so-called Stability and Growth Pact is not an instrument of law. It’s just an agreement between governments. And it was not helpful that, early in this century, both France and Germany violated the rules of the pact. Merkel would like to correct this mistake, but her chances of prevailing are rather small, particularly because she is not a very smooth operator.
Marsh: In his heart of hearts, Hans Tietmeyer didn’t want the Italians in EMU. You criticized him in the mid-1990s for being a German nationalist because he said then that we should have a hard core. Aren’t you now backing the same argument?

Schmidt: In the meantime many things have happened, the globalization of speculation, the globalization of money and capital markets, the globalization of financial instruments. We have seen the failure of a draft for a European constitution. We have seen this complex Lisbon treaty, many things have happened, and at the same time figures who could lead have become scarce. One very important figure was [former European Commission President] Jacques Delors . He has been replaced by people whose name one doesn’t really know. And the same goes for permanent secretaries and the chairmen of various commissions and for prime ministers and — what is his name — [European Council President Herman] Van Rompuy? And he has a so-called foreign secretary — a British lady, her name is not necessary to know either. The same goes, more or less, for the European Parliament. The only figure who sticks out in the European institutions is [European Central Bank President Jean-Claude] Trichet. I’m not sure how strong he is inside the European Central Bank, But, as far as I can see, he hasn’t made a major mistake so far. ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΤΟ ΛΕΕΙ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΤΑ ΕΖΗΣΕ ΔΕΚΑΕΤΙΕΣ ΚΑΤΙ ΞΕΡΕΙ. ΠΑΝΤΩΣ ΣΤΑ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΒΛΕΠΟΝΤΑΣ ΚΑΝΕΙΣ ΜΠΕΡΛΟΥΣΚΟΝΙ, ΣΑΡΚΟΖΙ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΡΚΕΛ ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΑΙΝΕΙ ΚΑΝΕΙΣ ΠΟΣΟ ΛΙΓΟΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ

Marsh: But of course the clock is now ticking for him. His mandate runs out at the end of October and he cannot be renewed.
Schmidt: Yes I know. But of course he’s totally independent. In a way this could give him the freedom to speak up, but the question is who would listen to him now that he has to leave his office in less than 12 months or so.
We are doing the same thing as the Chinese — the great difference is that the Chinese have their own currency and we haven’t.
Marsh: Greece and Portugal went into monetary union with a net foreign balance more or less of zero: their foreign assets and foreign debts were more or less equivalent. Then they ran current account deficits every year for around 10 years of 10% of gross national product. You don’t need to be a genius to work out that they now have a net foreign debt of 100% of GDP.
Schmidt: The question is: How come that no one took any notice — in Basel or in Brussels or in some statistical office? No one seems to have understood. By the way, for a long period the German political elite didn’t understand that we were recording surpluses on our current account. We are doing the same thing as the Chinese — the great difference is that the Chinese have their own currency and we haven’t. If we had our own currency it would have been revalued by now. To have kept the D-Mark, as Tietmeyer would have liked, would have led to speculation against the D-Mark at least once if not twice in the past 20 years in an order of magnitude worse than we have seen with Greece or Ireland. So far the idea of a common currency still has my full backing, even if the European leaders did fail to set the rules and made the enormous mistake to take in anybody.
Over the next 20 years, I think it is rather likely, at least 51% likely, that a hard core of the European Union will emerge. And it would comprise the French, the Germans, the Dutch — I’m not so sure about the Italians. I’m rather sure than the British would not be part of it, the same may come true of the Poles. It would not be a hard core in written paragraphs of paper but it would be a hard core de facto and not de jure.
Marsh: And of course the Benelux states would be part of this and Austria and probably Denmark and Sweden
Schmidt: Probably Austria, conceivably Denmark and Sweden. The Danes are very cautious — they would still look to London. ΑΣ ΕΧΟΥΜΕ ΥΠΟΨΗ ΟΤΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΟΛΥ ΠΙΘΑΝΟ ΚΑΠΟΙΑ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ( DE FACTO ) H ΕΕ ΝΑ ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΗΣΕΙ ΕΝΑ ΞΕΧΩΡΙΣΤΟ ΙΣΧΥΡΟ ΠΥΡΗΝΑ ΜΕ ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΤΗΝ ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΗ ΒΟΡΕΙΑ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ. ΑΥΤΟ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΚΥΡΙΩς ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΕΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΟΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΚΟ ΝΟΤΟ ΚΑΙ ΕΜΑΣ.

Marsh: I remember you saying many times, if the Germans keep the D-Mark we will make ourselves unpopular with the rest of the world; our banks and our currency would be the Number 1, all the other countries would be against us and that was why we should have the euro to embed us in a larger European undertaking. It’s all rather ironic, because people are saying that Germany has profited a great deal from the euro because the D-Mark has been kept down and this helps German exports.
ΧΜΜ ΑΡΑ ΙΣΩΣ ΤΟ ΕΥΡΟ ΗΤΑΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΗΜΙΣΥ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΗΜΙΣΥ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΣΤΗΡΙΓΜΕΝΗ KAI ΣΤΗΝ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΕΝΟΧΗ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΩΝ –ΠΑΝΤΩΣ ΠΑΛΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΟΦΕΛΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΩΝ ΗΤΑΝ Η ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗ
Schmidt: I ask myself whether this profit really is a profit? I wonder whether running perpetual current account surpluses really amounts to a profit. In the long run it is not a profit… ΕΔΩ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΥΠΕΚΦΕΥΓΕΙ ΜΕ ΒΑΣΗ ΜΙΑ ΤΕΧΝΙΚΗ ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΗ ΑΣ ΜΗΝ ΞΕΧΝΑΜΕ ΟΤΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟΣ
Marsh: Because in the long run these assets will have to be written down because people won’t pay them back … ΓΙΑ ΜΕΝΑ ΛΕΕΙ ΠΑΠΑΡΙΕΣ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΒΑΡΕΣΟΥΝ ΦΑΛΙΜΕΝΤΟ ΟΛΕΣ ΟΙ ΧΩΡΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΕ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΧΑΣΟΥΝ ΤΑ ΛΕΦΤΑ ΟΙ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟΙ
Schmidt: Yes … it means that you sell goods and what you get back is just paper money and later on it will be devalued and you will have to write it off. So you are withholding from your own nation goods that otherwise they would like to consume. ΑΥΤΟ ΘΑ ΙΣΧΥΣΕΙ ΜΟΝΟ ΑΝ ΚΑΤΑΡΡΕΥΣΕΙ ΕΝΤΕΛΩΣ ΤΟ ΕΥΡΩ ΚΑΤΙ ΠΟΥ ΔΕΝ ΒΛΕΠΩ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΟΥΤΕ ΤΩΡΑ ΟΥΤΕ ΣΤΟ ΜΕΛΛΟΝ ΠΛΗΝ ΚΑΠΟΙΩΝ ΜΕΡΙΚΩΝ ΖΗΜΙΩΝ ΑΛΛΑ ΤΟ ΣΕΝΑΡΙΟ ΟΛΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗΣ ΔΕΝ ΤΟ ΒΛΕΠΩ

Marsh: Would you say that in 20 years, if we have a hard bloc, that the currency would be higher than now?
Schmidt: Not necessarily would this [the hard core] pertain to the field of currencies but it would probably pertain to the field of world policies whether vis-á-vis China, Iran, Afghanistan or a new coalition of Muslim states, which is one of the great dangers of the 21st century, that you get a coalition of Muslim states. If there was a president in Washington and he wanted to drop the atomic bomb on Tehran, the Europeans would be strong enough to say: “We are not part of it.” Right now, no one is strong enough in Europe to be in that position. ΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ Η ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΙΣΧΥ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΩΣΗ ΠΟΥ ΦΤΑΝΕΙΣ ΣΕ ΑΥΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΣΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ. ΑΡΑ Η ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΚΑΠΟΙΕΣ ΦΟΡΕΣ ΜΕΣΟ ΓΙΑ ΤΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΑ ΤΑ ΔΥΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ ΜΠΛΕΓΜΕΝΑ ΜΕΤΑΞΥ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΝΟΜΙΖΩ ΕΙΝΑΙ Ο ΛΟΓΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΣΗΜΕΡΙΝΗΣ ΣΥΓΧΥΣΗΣ

Marsh: And what about France? They are always torn both ways — to the south but also to Germany. Do you think it’s irrefutable that France will always opt to go along with Germany in a smaller core monetary union?
Schmidt: It’s difficult to say. I said the probability would be 51% — that makes 49% left. I am not a prophet. I don’t know. It depends very much on the behavior of the Germans. When I was in power, I would always let the French march ahead on the red carpet. I never appeared as the leader, apart from once — over medium-range nuclear missiles that were targeted against German cities — and in the end that cost me my office. ΤΑ ΚΛΑΣΙΚΑ ΚΟΜΠΛΕΞΑΚΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ Β ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟ –ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΤΑ ΟΜΩΣ. ΠΑΝΤΩΣ ΘΕΩΡΩ ΟΤΙ ΟΙ ΓΑΛΛΟΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΟΛΥ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΟΙ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΦΗΣΟΥΝ ΑΠ ΕΞΩ ΑΠΟ ΜΙΑ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΛΙΓΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΙΣΧΥΡΩΝ
Marsh: And of course [French President François] Mitterrand came to Bonn in January 1983 after you had left office — the invitation came from you when you were chancellor. He made his great speech [supporting West Germany on medium-range missiles] and [Chancellor Helmut] Kohl reaped the benefits of that French solidarity. It is ironic how history turns out….

Schmidt: Yes, but this has had a good effect, since in 1987 they abolished all these weapons on both sides.
Marsh: People always said: “We don’t want a German Europe but a European Germany.” However, there is now a belief that, because of Germany’s power as the greatest Europe creditor nation, it is throwing its weight around too much in Europe.
Schmidt: My feeling is that Merkel doesn’t know she does it.
This is what we are doing now in Europe, muddling through. ΚΛΑΣΙΚΗ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΩΝ ΟΤΑΝ ΣΟΥ ΠΑΤΑΝΕ ΤΟ ΠΟΔΙ ΣΑΝ ΕΛΕΦΑΝΤΕΣ ΣΟΥ ΛΕΝΕ ΟΥΠΣ ΔΕΝ ΤΟ ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΑ ΟΤΙ ΕΙΜΑΙ ΤΟΣΟ ΒΑΡΥΣ
Marsh: Maybe if you are a creditor, maybe you’re vulnerable, you feel that your assets are going to be written down. Maybe it’s not good to be a creditor because it makes you unpopular. Maybe it also means that your bank balance, your reserves are always going to be less high than you thought they would be, because people are not going to be able to repay their debts … ΠΑΛΙ ΘΕΩΡΩ ΜΙΚΡΗ ΤΗ ΠΙΘΑΝΟΤΗΤΑ ΑΝΑ ΧΑΣΟΥΝ ΤΑ ΦΡΑΓΚΑ ΟΙ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟΙ ΓΕΝΙΚΑ ΟΙ ΑΠΩΛΕΙΕΣ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΩΝ ΩΣ ΠΙΣΤΩΤΩΝ ΘΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΕΡΙΟΡΙΣΜΕΝΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΜΕΝΕΣ

Schmidt: It goes far beyond the question of currencies and currency reserves. And therefore it applies to psychology … I am speaking of the psychology of nations and their public opinions and their published opinions. [Because of the Nazis and the Second World War] Germany will remain in debt for a long time — for all of the 21st century, maybe even for the 22nd century too. The Germans indeed sometimes behave like the strongest nation, they tend to give lessons to everybody. In fact they are more vulnerable than they think. ΕΝΔΙΑΦΕΡΟΥΣΑ ΑΠΟΨΗ ΑΠΟ ΕΝΑ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟ

Marsh: But the Germans themselves don’t feel strong, the man in the street feels, I think, somewhat uncertain; the wages in real terms have been under pressure for many years. The average Germans don’t feel strong and confident, I think.
Schmidt: That is probably correct. But that does not include the political class. That does not necessarily include the right wing of Christian Democrats. And it doesn’t necessarily include the extreme left. .
Marsh: Europe thought it could put crises behind us by getting rid of its internal exchange rates and forging monetary union. But it now seems that, because of the globalization of finance, the speculators will now attack the spreads [between different countries’ bond yields]. Before they attacked the currencies, now they attack the bond markets.

Schmidt: One of the weakest points in the global economy is that there is no control of the behavior of financial managers. You can divide mankind into three categories. In the first category are normal people like you and me. We may have once stolen an apple from a neighbor’s trees when we were boys, or we may have taken a bar of chocolate from a supermarket without paying for it. But otherwise we are dependable, normal human beings. Then secondly you have a small category of people with a criminal character. And thirdly you have investment bankers.That includes all the dealers and the deal makers. They all sail under different names, but they’re all the same. ΑΠΙΣΤΕΥΤΗ ΠΑΡΑΔΟΧΗ ΑΠΟ ΕΝΑ ΠΟΛΥ ΓΝΩΣΤΟ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΤΕΣΤΗΜΕΝΟΥ ΠΟΥ ΑΦΗΣΕ ΣΑΦΗ ΑΙΧΜΗ ΟΧΙ ΜΟΝΟ ΓΙΑ ΤΗ ΔΥΝΑΜΗ ΤΩΝ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΙΤΩΝ ΑΛΛΑ ΚΥΡΙΩΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗ ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΦΟΡΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΥ ΠΡΟΚΑΛΕΙ Η ΤΟΣΗ ΔΥΝΑΜΗ ΤΟΥΣ

Marsh: What about Britain? You had a very good relationship with [former Prime Minister James] Callaghan but he didn’t join the European Monetary System. Do you think we did right to steer clear of monetary union? I know you think we will be outside for a long time and I think you’re right. Do you think that was fundamentally the correct decision?
Schmidt: Fundamentally I think [French President Charles] de Gaulle was right — long before the European Monetary System
Marsh: You mean he was right in believing that the U.K. would always choose the U.S. over Europe? ΜΕΓΑΛΗ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΗ ΒΡΕΤΑΝΙΑ ΟΙ ΑΓΓΛΟΙ ΘΕΛΟΥΝ ΝΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΘΑΡΑ ΚΥΡΙΑΡΧΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΧΙ ΙΣΟΙ ΑΝΑΜΕΣΑ ΣΤΟΥΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΟΥΣ ΟΠΟΤΕ Η ΜΟΝΗ ΛΥΣΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΝΑ ΣΥΜΠΡΑΞΟΥΝ ΜΕ ΤΙΣ ΗΠΑ ΕΣΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΣΕ ΕΝΑ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟ ΡΟΛΟ

Schmidt: I used to believe in British common sense and the British state rationale. I was brought up in a very Anglophile way. I was a great supporter of Edward Heath who brought Britain into the European community. But then we had Harold Wilson and Margaret Thatcher, who didn’t always behave so sensibly. and then we had Tony Blair who brought himself into a position of far too great a dependence on America. You can’t have this dependence on America and at the same time play a responsible role in Europe. The British have always been good, though, at muddling through — and this is what we are doing now in Europe, muddling through. ΚΟΙΤΑΞΑ ΤΗ ΛΕΞΗ ΣΕ ΛΕΞΙΚΟ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ: ΤΑ ΚΟΥΤΣΟΚΑΤΑΦΕΡΝΩ ΜΕΣΑ ΣΤΟ ΧΑΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΧΑΜΟ ΧΩΡΙΣ ΝΑ ΞΕΡΩ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΑ ΤΙ ΜΟΥ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ
COPYRIGHT OMFIF 2010

ΠΗΓΗ: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/schmidt-leadership-wanted-in-europe-2010-12-07?pagenumber=2

ΠΑΡΑΠΟΜΠΗ
ΓΙΑ ΟΣΟΥΣ ΔΕΝ ΞΕΡΟΥΝ ΕΠΕΙΔΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΕΧΝΙΚΟ ΘΕΜΑ ΠΟΥ ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙ ΝΑ ΤΟ ΞΕΡΩ ΚΑΙ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΜΙΑ ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΗ ΣΕ ΒΑΘΟΣ ΟΣΟ ΜΠΟΡΩ ΧΩΡΙΣ ΝΑ ΚΑΝΩ ΤΟΝ ΕΞΥΠΝΟ :
ΜΙΑ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ ΜΕ ΕΝΑ ΚΟΙΝΟ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑ ΚΑΙ ΜΙΑ ΚΟΙΝΗ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΑΡΧΗ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΕΧΕΙ ΩΣ ΣΤΗΡΙΞΗ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΠΕΤΥΧΕΙ ΜΑΚΡΟΠΡΟΘΕΣΜΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΟΙΝΗ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΥ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ ΚΟΙΝΗ ΦΟΡΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΚΟΙΝΟ ΔΙΑΚΡΑΤΙΚΟ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΔΑΠΑΝΩΝ.

ΑΥΤΟ ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙ ΓΙΑΤΙ ΣΕ ΜΙΑ ΚΡΙΣΗ ΜΕ ΑΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΑ ΣΟΚ ΟΠΟΥ Η ΜΙΑ ΧΩΡΑ ΑΣ ΠΟΥΜΕ ΕΧΕΙ ΧΑΜΗΛΗ ΖΗΤΗΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΓΩΓΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΝΗΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗ (ΠΧ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ) ΚΑΙ ΜΙΑ ΑΛΛΗ ΜΕ ΥΨΗΛΗ ΖΗΤΗΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΓΩΓΗ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗ( ΠΧ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΑ) Ο ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΝΟΜΙΚΟΣ ΜΗΧΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΜΕΤΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΜΕΣΩ ΤΗΣ ΦΟΡΟΛΟΓΗΣΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΝΟΜΗΣ ΔΑΠΑΝΩΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ ΣΤΗ ΧΩΡΑ ΜΕ ΤΟ ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑ ΩΣΤΕ ΝΑ ΑΠΟΤΡΕΨΕΙ ΤΗ ΚΡΙΣΗ ΠΟΥ ΤΕΛΙΚΑ ΘΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΚΡΙΣΗ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΗ. ΣΕ ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΗ ΠΟΥ ΔΕΝ ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ ΚΟΙΝΟ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑ, Η ΧΩΡΑ ΣΕ ΚΡΙΣΗ ΘΑ ΟΔΗΓΗΘΕΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΥΠΟΤΙΜΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΟΣ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΜΠΟΡΕΣΕΙ ΝΑ ΑΠΟΠΛΗΡΩΣΕΙ ΤΟ  ΔΙΟΓΚΟΥΜΕΝΟ ΣΥΣΣΩΡΕΥΜΕΝΟ ΧΡΕΟΣ.

ΟΙ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟΙ ΒΕΒΑΙΑ ΔΕΝ ΤΟ ΘΕΛΟΥΝ ΑΥΤΟ ΓΙΑΤΙ ΘΑ ΒΡΕΘΟΥΝ ΝΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ Η ΙΣΧΥΡΗ ΧΩΡΑ ΠΟΥ ΘΑ ΕΝΙΣΧΥΕΙ ΜΕΣΩ ΦΟΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΑΠΑΝΩΝ ΤΙΣ ΑΝΙΣΧΥΡΕΣ (ΚΥΡΙΩΣ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΤΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΙΚΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΗΣ).
ΑΝΤΙ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΤΕΘΗΚΕ ΤΟ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΑΘΕΡΟΤΗΤΑΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΠΟΤΡΕΠΕΙ ΥΠΟΤΙΘΕΤΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΧΩΡΕΣ ΑΠΟ ΜΕΓΑΛΑ ΕΛΛΕΙΜΜΑΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΧΡΕΟΣ ΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΤΗΚΕ ΑΠΟ ΟΛΟΥΣ. ΑΠΟ ΑΛΛΟΥΣ ΠΙΟ ΠΟΛΥ ΑΠΟ ΑΛΛΟΥΣ ΠΙΟ ΛΙΓΟ.

ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΑ ΔΕΝ ΘΑ ΕΠΡΕΠΕ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ Η ΖΩΝΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΥΡΟ ΠΛΗΝ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΑΣ, ΓΑΛΛΙΑΣ, ΑΥΣΤΡΙΑΣ ΒΕΛΓΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΟΛΛΑΝΔΙΑΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΠΡΟΦΑΝΩΣ ΕΠΕΚΤΑΘΗΚΕ ΓΙΑ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΙΣΩΣ ΑΚΟΜΑ ΓΙΑΤΙ ΤΕΛΙΚΑ ΩΦΕΛΗΣΕ  ΤΙΣ ΠΑΡΑΠΑΝΩ ΧΩΡΕΣ, ΚΑΘΩς ΕΞΑΣΦΑΛΙΣΕ ΠΕΡΙΣΣΟΤΕΡΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΧΑΜΗΛΟΤΕΡΟΥ ΚΟΣΤΟΥΣ ΕΞΑΓΩΓΕΣ ΣΕ 16 ΣΥΝΟΛΙΚΑ ΧΩΡΕΣ ΕΝΩ ΤΟ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑ ΕΧΕΙ ΩΣ ΒΑΣΗ ΜΙΑ ΤΕΡΑΣΤΙΑ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΜΕ ΑΕΠ 8,4 ΤΡΙΣΕΚΑΤΟΜΜΥΡΙΑ ΕΥΡΩ .

η συνέντευξη υπάρχει και στα Ελληνικά αλλά όχι ολόκληρη.

http://cebil.gr/news/Xelmoyt-Smit-H-Eyropi-den-exei-igetes

Το κομμάτι που αναφέρει για την καταστροφική απληστία και τη δύναμη των τραπεζίτων δεν το αναφέρει καμιά μετάφραση τυχαίο ; …δεν νομίζω!

Read Full Post »